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Did the Death of Distance Hurt 
Detroit and Help New York?
Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
10.1    Introduction
Thirty years ago, every major northeastern and midwestern city looked 
troubled. America had twenty cities with more than 450,000 people in 1950. 
Every one of them lost population between 1950 and 1980, except for Los 
Angeles, Houston, and Seattle. The primary source of economic decline for 
these places was a decline of manufacturing, which ﬁ  rst suburbanized, as 
in the case of Henry Ford’s River Rouge Plant, and then left metropolitan 
areas altogether. Improvements in information technology had made it quite 
easy for corporate leaders, who often remained in the older cities, to manage 
production in cheaper locales.
But since 1980, a number of older cities, which had been declining, started 
once again to grow, both in population, and often more strikingly, in incomes. 
Places like New York, San Francisco, Boston, and Minneapolis have all 
thrived since the 1970s, generally in idea-  intensive industries like ﬁ  nance, 
professional services, and new technology. Urban density that once served 
to connect manufacturers with railroads and boats now serves to facili-
tate contact of smart people in idea-  producing sectors. The idea-  producing 
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advantages of geographic concentration are not a new phenomenon. After 
all, Alfred Marshall wrote in 1890 (225) that in dense agglomerations, “the 
mysteries of the trade become no mystery, but are, as it were, in the air.” 
However, these idea-  producing advantages appear to be more and more 
critical to the success of older, high-  density cities.
This chapter advances the hypothesis that improvements in transporta-
tion and communication technology can explain both the decline of Detroit 
and the reinvigoration of Manhattan. While we present some suggestive 
evidence, the main contribution of this chapter is a model that illustrates 
how reductions in the costs of communication can cause manufacturing 
cities to decline and innovative cities to grow. Reductions in transport costs 
reduce the advantages associated with making goods in the Midwest, but 
they increase the returns to producing new ideas in New York.
In the model, individuals choose between three activities: (a) innovating, 
which creates more varieties of advanced products; (b) manufacturing those 
advanced goods; and (c) producing in a traditional sector, which we think 
of as agriculture. Firms can also choose whether to locate in a city or in 
the hinterland. Urban location is associated with the scarcity of real estate 
but also with the availability of shared infrastructure and with knowledge 
spillovers that depend on the direct interaction between individuals and 
therefore thrive on density.
We assume that the traditional sector needs land the most and suﬀers 
the least from poor communication, while the innovative sector needs land 
the least and loses the most from communication diﬃculties. Since the city 
has a comparative advantage in speeding communication and has limited—
and hence expensive—land, the traditional sector locates entirely in the 
hinterland, while the innovative sector locates entirely in the city. The manu-
facturing sector is generally split between the city and the hinterland. These 
predictions of the model roughly describe modern America, where high 
human capital industries tend to be centralized within metropolitan areas, 
manufacturing is in medium-  density areas, and natural resource-  based 
industries are generally nonurban (Glaeser and Kahn 2001).
All individuals have the same level of productivity in the manufacturing 
or traditional sectors, but we assume that there is heterogeneous ability to 
innovate. As a result, the most able people end up in the innovative sector. 
Heterogeneity of ability determines decreasing returns to the size of the 
innovative sector, and it also predicts that the economy will become more 
unequal if it becomes more innovative.
The model allows us to consider the impact of improvements in informa-
tion technology. We model these improvements as a reduction in the disad-
vantage that people working in the hinterland suﬀer due to the local nature 
of knowledge spillovers and the inability to share urban infrastructure. This 
may aﬀect both the manufacturing and innovative sectors; however, as long 
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is the cost associated with advanced manufacturing in the hinterland. In 
our view, the comparative statics are meant to reﬂ  ect the increasing ability 
of corporate leaders or idea producers, who remain in urban areas, to com-
municate with far-  ﬂ  ung production facilities.
When the costs of distance fall, manufacturing ﬁ  rms leave the city, which 
causes a decline in urban income and property values. The economy as a 
whole is getting more productive as the city’s advantage in production is 
disappearing. This eﬀect captures the decline in erstwhile manufacturing 
powerhouses like Cleveland and Detroit.
But the decline in communication costs also has two other impacts, which 
are more benign for the city. Most importantly, reducing these communi-
cation costs increases the returns to innovation. Since the city has a com-
parative advantage in producing new ideas, this eﬀect increases incomes in 
the urban area. The exodus of manufacturing and the decline in the costs 
of urban land also increase the total size of the innovative sector in the city, 
which in turn further bolsters urban success through the increasing returns 
to new idea production that are a key element in models like ours (Grossman 
and Helpman 1991; Romer 1990).
As communication costs decline and the size of the innovative sector 
increases, within-  city inequality increases. This increase in inequality does 
not represent a welfare loss, for improvements in communication tech-
nology improve the real wages for all workers, even though nominal wages 
for workers in the city decline. City population will rise as city manufactur-
ing declines, because the innovative sector is less land intensive than the 
manufacturing sector.
As long as manufacturing is the industry on the margin between the city 
and the hinterland, decreasing the productivity costs of locating in the hin-
terland will reduce city property values. However, once all manufacturing 
has left the city, further decreases in communication costs impact the city 
mainly by increasing the returns to innovation through a reduction of the 
costs of production. In this case, further improvement in information tech-
nology causes urban land values to rise. We think of the ﬁ  rst case as cap-
turing cities like New York and Boston in the 1970s, when the exodus of 
manufacturing ﬁ  rst caused property values to plummet, while the extension 
reﬂ  ects these cities in more recent years, when booming innovative sectors 
have been associated with rising real estate costs.
We also extend the model to consider a second city. The agglomeration 
externality implied by local knowledge spillovers makes it eﬃcient for the 
innovative sector to cluster completely in one of the two cities. Manufac-
turing instead locates in both. In this case, an improvement in communica-
tion technology causes the more innovative city to increase its population 
and real income relative to the manufacturing city. When improvements 
in transportation technology reduce manufacturers’ dependence on urban 
infrastructure, property values in the two cities also diverge. This model is 306        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
meant to show how technological progress can strengthen idea-  oriented 
cities and hurt production-  oriented cities.
After discussing the model, we turn to a little suggestive evidence. First, 
we document the connection between urban success and specialization in 
innovation, measured, as the model suggests, by employment in primarily 
nongovernmental occupations that are high education. Specialization in 
these high-  education and presumably more innovative sectors is positively 
correlated with income growth between 1980 and 2000 and with employ-
ment growth over the same time period in the Northeast and Midwest. We 
also ﬁ  nd that successful places increased their specialization in these activi-
ties, just as the model suggests.
Second, we turn to the model’s predictions about urban inequality. We 
ﬁ  nd that inequality within cities rose more in cities that had faster income 
growth and in cities with more initial specialization in skilled occupations 
initially. These eﬀects, however, are modest.
10.2      Urban Diversity and Improvements in Communication Technology
Before proceeding to the model, we ﬁ  rst review four facts that motivate the 
model: (a) the past forty years have seen spectacular improvements in com-
munication and transportation technology; (b) those improvements have 
made separation between idea producers and manufacturers increasingly 
common; (c) there has been a remarkable heterogeneity in the growth of 
both income and population among many older cities since 1980; and (d) 
while all of the older cities suﬀered a signiﬁ  cant decline in manufacturing 
jobs, the successful older cities have increasingly specialized in idea- intensive 
sectors.
Thousands of pages have been written about the improvements in trans-
portation and telecommunication that have made it easier to ship goods 
and communicate ideas over long distances. Glaeser and Kohlhase (2004) 
summarize some of the evidence on the decline in moving goods over space; 
the real cost of moving a ton one mile by rail has declined by more than 90 
percent over the last 120 years. The improvements in other transport modes 
have been at least as striking, and the improvements in communications 
technology are, if anything, even more miraculous. Figure 10.1 shows the 
decline in the real cost of a three-  minute phone call between New York and 
London from 1930 to 2000. The decline has been more than 99 percent.
The substantial improvement in information and transportation tech-
nology has at least two separate sources. First, there has been a proliferation 
of new technologies that facilitate communication across space. Among 
the communication technologies that were not generally available in 1975 
but are commonplace today are fax machines, cellular phones, e-  mail, the 
Internet, Wi- Fi, and personal digital assistants. Many of these technologies, 
such as cellular phones, existed before 1975, but they only became widely 
aﬀordable after that date.Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?    3 0 7
Increased competition in key communication sectors like telephones, 
air travel, and cargo shipping has also improved the ability to exchange 
infor  mation, goods, and services over long distances. For example, in 1973, 
Federal Express began challenging the U.S. Postal Service in providing 
speedy delivery of packages. In 1982, as part of a settlement of an antitrust 
case, AT&T divested its local exchanges. After this divestment, there was a 
considerable increase in long-  distance phone companies, such as MCI and 
Sprint, that made long-  distance communication cheaper. In the late 1970s, 
the airline industry was also deregulated, which increased competition and 
reduced prices in that sector.
These technological improvements have been accompanied by an “in-
creasing separation of the management and production facilities of indi-
vidual ﬁ  rms” (Duranton and Puga 2005). Duranton and Puga (2005) con-
nect this separation to the increasing specialization of cities on the basis 
of function (i.e., management or production) rather than industrial sector. 
Kim (1999) is among the empirical sources cited by those authors, and he 
found that the share of manufacturing workers in the United States working 
in multiunit ﬁ  rms increased from 51 percent in 1937 to 73 percent in 1977. 
There is also an increase in the number of corporate headquarters that are 
separate from their production facilities (Kim 1999), which is also seen in 
the work of Henderson and Ono (2008). The rise in multinational ﬁ  rms, 
which has been extensively documented and discussed (Markusen 1995), 
represents a particularly extreme example of increasing geographic distance 
between ﬁ  rm leadership and production.
Our third motivating fact concerns the heterogeneity in urban success 
Fig. 10.1    Secular decline in communication costs
Source: International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (1997).308        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
within the United States over the last forty years. Population and income 
give us two alternative measures of urban growth, and ﬁ  gure 10.2 shows 
the path of population for six major metropolitan areas. Since 1970, San 
Francisco has grown by more than 17 percent. Chicago has grown by 13 
percent, while Detroit has lost more than 20 percent of its population. New 
York and Boston lost population in the 1970s but have gained since then. 
Over the third decade, the population of New York increased by 2 percent, 
while the population of Boston rose by 8 percent. Cleveland has steadily 
lost population.
There has also been substantial divergence in income levels across metro-
politan areas. Figure 10.3 shows the time path of earnings per worker in the 
largest county of each of these metropolitan areas. Since the U.S. Census 
Bureau County Business Patterns is the natural source of ﬁ  rm-  level data, 
this pushes us to look at the counties that surround the areas’ economic 
centers. The earnings of New York and San Francisco soar over this time 
period. Wayne county (Detroit) begins with the highest payroll per worker 
and declines over the time period, starting out quite prosperous but losing 
substantially relative to the other two areas. In 1977, Wayne’s payroll per 
worker was slightly higher than that of New York, and today it is less than 
60 percent of income in New York.
Figure 10.4 shows the distribution of median family income across 
metropolitan areas in 1980 and 2000. As the ﬁ  gure shows, the variance of 
incomes across metropolitan areas increased substantially over this twenty 
year period. Almost all of the increase occurred in the 1980s.
Our ﬁ  nal motivating fact is that the successful cities are specialized in 
idea-  producing industries, while the less successful cities are in social ser-
Fig. 10.2    Population growth across cities, 1970 to 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?    3 0 9
vices with some remaining manufacturing. Table 10.1 shows the top ﬁ  ve 
industry groups measured by total payroll in the largest counties of the six 
metropolitan areas shown in 1977 and 2002. In 1977, manufacturing domi-
nates four of the six cities, sometimes by a very substantial margin. In 1977, 
more than one-  half of Wayne county’s payroll was in manufacturing. Even 
in New York, the payroll in ﬁ  nance and insurance only slightly nudged out 
manufacturing.
Fig. 10.4    Change in the distribution of median family income across cities, 1980 
to 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau.
Fig. 10.3    Trends in earnings per worker across cities, 1977 to 2002 (by country)
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By 2002, manufacturing remains the dominant sector in Detroit and 
Cleveland, but it is now a much smaller share of the total payroll. In 2002, 
more than 53 percent of the payroll in New York is in ﬁ  nance and insurance 
and professional, scientiﬁ  c, and technical services. More than 40 percent of 
the payroll of San Francisco lies in these two areas. Chicago and Boston 
are more mixed, and they do both idea-  oriented production and manufac-
turing. In the next section, we present a model that attempts to explain the 
divergence of city economies as a result of improvements in the ability to 
communicate across space.
10.3    The  Model
10.3.1    Basic  Setup
This model attempts to describe innovation and production in a closed 
economy where labor is mobile across space. We will address interurban 
inequalities in an extension that allows for a second city, but we begin with 
two locations: a city and the hinterland. Workers choose between three occu-
pations: working in the traditional sector, working in the advanced sector, 
and innovating in a way that produces more varieties of diﬀerentiated goods 
for the advanced sector.
Individual utility is deﬁ  ned over the traditional good Z and measure n of 
advanced goods that are aggregated into a composite commodity Y in the 
manner of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977):




1/   
, with    (0, 1).
The traditional good Z is produced with a ﬁ  xed technology that has con-
stant returns to scale. The market for Z is perfectly competitive, so its price 
equals unit cost: pZ   cZ. We treat Z as the numeraire so that pZ equals 1.
Our focus is on demand for the advanced goods, and we will characterize 
aggregate demand by the homothetic preferences of a representative house-
hold, whose budget share for Y is
(2)   (pY)   
pYY
 
pYY   Z
.
For example, if the utility function has constant elasticity of substitution 
  so that U(Y, Z)   (1 –    )1/   Y( – 1)/      1/   Z( – 1)/  , then the budget share is 
 (pY)   [pY
 – 1 / (1  –    )   1]– 1. We will assume that elasticity of substitution 
is never below 1; equivalently, that demand for the advanced good has no 
less than unitary own-  price elasticity; hence, that   (pY)   0. Individuals 
will also need to consume exactly one unit of location-  speciﬁ  c capital as a 
residence.
Each diﬀerentiated advanced good is produced by a monopolistic com-312        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
petitor at a constant unit cost of cx. As in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), monopo-
listic competition with constant elasticity of substitution implies markup 
pricing, so the price of each diﬀerentiated good, px, satisﬁ  es





and monopoly proﬁ  ts are





where X is the total output of diﬀerentiated varieties by identical producers. 
This implies the price index for the composite commodity Y:
(5)  pY   n  (1    )/   px.
Thus, greater variety is equivalent to higher eﬃciency. As in Ethier (1982), we 
could interpret the invention of new goods as an increase in specialization, 
associated with productivity gains arising from the division of labor.
10.3.2    The  Innovation  Sector
Each worker requires  n units of location- speciﬁ  c capital (i.e., land) to pro-
duce innovation and one unit of location-  speciﬁ  c capital for a residence.
Advanced goods are invented by an innovative sector that thrives on prox-
imity. The urban advantage in producing new ideas is a reﬂ  ection of knowl-
edge spillovers that depend on the face-  to-  face interactions of researchers 
and are therefore local. Each innovator’s productivity depends on the exter-
nal eﬀect S of aggregate human capital. In the manner of Fujita and Thisse 
(2003), we assume that the innovation knowledge spillovers in the city are a 
function of the number of innovators in the city Ln
U and of the number of 
innovators outside of the city Ln
R:
(6) 
     















where     0 measures the returns to scale in knowledge externalities, and    
(0,1) is an inverse measure of the diﬃculty of achieving proﬁ  table spillovers 
by means of occasional long-  distance communication rather than day-  to-
  day proximity. For innovators who locate outside of the city, low density 
implies that all interactions are sporadic, yielding spillovers
(7) 
     












Each worker’s knowledge stock is assumed for simplicity to be identical, 
depending on worldwide scientiﬁ  c progress. With a convenient normaliza-
tion, h( j)   1 for all j. Hence,Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?    3 1 3
(8)  SU   (Ln
U    Ln
R)    SR     (Ln
U   Ln
R)  for all Ln
U, Ln
R,
implying that it is eﬃcient for all knowledge workers to congregate in the 
city.
Workers are heterogeneously endowed with creativity, according to a 
Pareto distribution (cf. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple 2004) with minimum 
a     0 and shape     1 so that
(9)  F(a)   1    
a
 
a   
  
 and f(a)    a  
 a   1,
and each urban innovator’s output is aSU. We assume that all individuals 
have the same output in manufacturing both the diﬀerentiated goods and 
the numeraire and that all heterogeneity is in creativity. As a result, creative 
people sort perfectly into the innovative sector, and employment in this sec-
tor is characterized by a marginal worker with creativity t. Heterogeneity in 
the ability to innovate both acts as a check on the amount of innovation—
because eventually, the marginal innovator is not very good at innovating—
and as a predictor of more inequality in the innovative sector.
When all innovation occurs in the city, total employment in innovation is
(10)  Ln   Ln
U   L[1   F(t)]   La  
 t  ,
and therefore knowledge spillovers are
(11)  SU   L 
n   L a  
  t   ,
and the total amount of innovation is
(12)  n   LSU ∫
 
t
af(a)da   L1  a  
(1  )   
 
    1
t1 (1  ) .
For notational convenience, deﬁ  ne the inverse measure of productivity
(13)   n   L 1/ [(1  )  1] 
a   
 
  1 
  / [(1  )  1]
,
which is decreasing in the mean of the skill distribution a   / (  –  1) and in the 
size of the pool of workers L, because a larger pool means that more able 
people will be available to this sector.
Then, as a function of the amount of innovation, employment equals
(14)  Ln    nn / [(1  )  1],
and the output of the marginal innovator equals
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Free entry into this sector means that  tSU must equal the opportunity cost 
of labor for this marginal worker plus the cost of  n units of location- speciﬁ  c 
capital.
10.3.3    The  Spatial  Equilibrium
Production of manufacturing goods occurs with a Leontief technology, 
with  x unit of location- speciﬁ  c capital per worker employed in production, 
in addition to one unit of capital as a residence. Output per worker depends 
on local knowledge spillovers S , with    [0,1] measuring the importance 
of knowledge spillovers for manufacturing relative to innovation. It is also a 
function of the availability of labor-  saving urban infrastructure. Producing 
one unit of advanced goods in the city requires  xSU
–    units of labor, and 
producing it in the hinterland requires  x(1    x)SR
–   .
This setup enables us to nest two extreme versions of the model. In the 
ﬁ  rst version, there are no knowledge spillovers, which requires     0, but 
cities have innate productivity advantages due to transportation and other 
infrastructure. We assume that this infrastructure costs a ﬁ  xed amount 
F   K [(1    x) –     –   1]/  (1    x) that is defrayed by real estate taxation. In 
the second version, cities have no innate productivity advantages, but there 
are spillovers.
Production of the traditional good is unaﬀected by knowledge spillovers, 
requiring  z unit of labor in the city and  z (1    z) in the hinterland, as well 
as  Z units of location-  speciﬁ  c capital per unit of labor in production, plus 
one unit in consumption. We normalize the units of labor so that  Z(1    z) 
equals 1.
We also allow innovators to derive a productivity beneﬁ  t from the pres-
ence of urban infrastructure, so a rural innovator’s output is aSR/ (1    n) for 
some parameter  n capturing the substitution of labor for infrastructure.
We assume that the traditional sector is quite capital intensive, which is 
meant to reﬂ  ect the heavy use of land in agriculture. The advanced produc-
tion sector uses an intermediate level of capital, and innovation requires the 
least amount of capital, because that sector is in the business of producing 
ideas. As such,
(16)   Z    x    n   0.
We also assume that the value of urban infrastructure has the reverse rank-
ing across sectors, so
(17)   n    x    Z   0.
The city is endowed with K units of location- speciﬁ  c capital, and the hin-
terland is endowed with KR units of this same capital. We assume that rural 
capital is not a scarce resource, because KR   (1    Z)L, so there would be 
excess land, even if everyone lived in the hinterland and worked in the most 
land-  intensive sector. As a result, the price of rural capital will equal zero. Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?    3 1 5
On the other hand, urban capital is scarce, so not all the population can be 
productively employed in the city, even in the least land-  intensive sector: 
K   (1    n)L.
We are interested in the case where there is some advanced manufacturing 
in both the rural and urban areas. If the advanced producers are indiﬀerent 
between these two locations, which is necessary for production to occur in 
both places, then the traditional producers, who have greater land require-
ments and less productivity losses due to distance from the city, will all pre-
fer to locate in the hinterland. Since both the price of the traditional output 
and the labor requirement  z (1    z) are normalized to 1 the wage in the 
hinterland also equals 1.
Workers must pay for their one unit of residential capital. Since they could 
earn a wage of 1 in the hinterland, they must then be paid a wage
(18)  wU   1   wK
in the city, where wK is the price of location- speciﬁ  c capital in the urban area. 
This implies that the cost of producing one unit of each advanced good in 
the urban area equals  x[1   (1    x)wK]SU
–   , and the cost of producing the 
same good in the hinterland equals  x(1    x)SR
–   .
When advanced manufacturing takes place in both the city and the 
rural area, then the price of urban capital must make advanced producers 
indiﬀerent between the two locations, which requires that
(19)  wK   
1
 
1    x




   1 .
Indiﬀerence for the marginal worker between the urban innovation sector 
and the two manufacturing sectors implies that the value of research output 
for the marginal researcher, net of capital costs, must equal the wage that 
could be earned in urban manufacturing:
(20)   tSU   wK n   wU.
As long as there is urban manufacturing, no innovators choose to locate out 
of the city. The latter would be the most proﬁ  table choice for an individual 





   
 a
 
1    n
   
(1    n)wK   
(1    n) SU   SR
,
and this is impossible when equation (19) holds, because then, equations 
(8), (16), and (17) imply
(22)  wK   
1
 




   1    
1
 
1    n (1    n)
SU  
SR
   1 .
To complete the equilibrium, we note that the total production of advanced 
goods combines rural and urban production, or316        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto




 x LU   
   
 
1    x
LR ,
where LU and LR denote, respectively, urban and rural employment in ad-
vanced manufacturing. The total amount of labor used in the three sectors 
must sum to the total amount of labor in the economy, which implies:
(24)  L   Ln   LU   LR   Z.
We are interested in the case where capital is scarce in the city and is 
completely used up by residential and production uses associated with the 
innovative sector and the production of diﬀerentiated goods:
(25)  K   (1    n)Ln   (1    x)LU.
10.3.4    Comparative  Statics
The primary value of this model is to examine the impact that an improve-
ment in communication technology would have on the success of the city. 
The state of transport and information technology can be summarized by 
the single parameter
(26)      (1    x)       1   0,
which captures the productivity gain that manufacturers derive from locat-
ing in the city. The urban advantage includes two diﬀerent components. For 
 x   0, manufacturers beneﬁ  t from the value of urban infrastructure—for 
example, as a transport hub. For     1 and     0, they also proﬁ  t from 
knowledge spillovers by colocating with urban innovators.
As we show in the appendix, the equilibrium of this model is deﬁ  ned by 
urban employment in innovation
(27)  Ln   
(    1)(1    ) (pY)
   
    (1    ) (pY)
 
(1    x)L    K
   
1    x   (1    n) 
.
Innovation reduces the cost of producing advanced goods and therefore 
the Dixit-  Stiglitz price index pY. This decrease in price may then increase 
the share of the budget spent on advanced goods if demand is suﬃciently 
elastic: then, the increase in demand for the advanced sector in turn drives 
innovation up further. To guarantee a stable equilibrium, we must assume 
that the budget share does not increase too much as price declines:
(28) 
 [    (1    ) (pY)]
    
(1    )[(1    )    1]       





The right- hand side of this equation is the own- price elasticity of the budget 
share of Y, which can identically be expressed as ε –   1, where ε is the (abso-
lute value of) own-  price elasticity of demand for Y. The left-  hand side cap-
tures the extent to which heterogeneous ability creates decreasing returns in Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?    3 1 7
the innovative sector (low  ). The decreasing returns that come from drawing 
less and less able people into the innovative sector must oﬀset the increasing 
returns that come from greater variety (low  ), as well as those deriving from 
knowledge spillovers (high   and  ).
In a stable equilibrium where manufacturing locates in both the city and 
the hinterland, improvements in transportation and communication tech-
nology are described by a reduction in  . A decrease in the cost of distance 
may also reduce the value of urban infrastructure for innovators  n, and any 
decrease in   reduces the value of proximity for innovation, as well as for 
manufacturing. However, as long as the innovative sector is not so large that 
the city is completely specialized, manufacturing rather than innovation is 
on the spatial margin; therefore, changes in the productivity of innovation 
in the hinterland do not impact equilibrium quantities.
A decline in   causes urban property values to decline. As it becomes 
easier to produce diﬀerentiated goods in the hinterland, the price of urban 
capital declines, since the value of being in the city for advanced manufactur-
ers declines. This eﬀect captures the decline of old manufacturing cities in 
the ﬁ  rst twenty-  ﬁ  ve years after World War II, when manufacturing subur-
banized and then went to lower-  density areas within the United States. The 
wages for production workers in the city also fall, since they need to be paid 
less to be compensated for having to buy urban residential capital.
The reduction in the cost of urban capital, however, is a boon to the 
innovative sector, because that capital is an input into production that has 
decreased in price. As the price of urban capital falls, the amount of urban 
innovation rises, because it has become cheaper to produce. This is one 
reason why decreasing communication costs increases the amount of inno-
vation.
A second reason is that improvements in communication technology 
cause the cost of producing the advanced good to fall. As this price falls, 
the budget share of Y increases if demand is elastic—or in other words, if 
the elasticity of substitution between the two goods Y and Z in the util-
ity function ( ) is above unity.1 Then, the market for the advanced sector 
expands, making innovation more proﬁ  table, thereby attracting previously 
extramarginal innovators.
PROPOSITION 1. As   declines because of an improvement in information 
and transportation technology, the price of advanced goods falls, and all real 
incomes rise. Output of advanced manufacturing increases, while output of the 
traditional good and employment in its production contract. Innovation and 
employment in innovation increase.
1. Furthermore, if advanced goods were a luxury, their budget share would increase with 
real income and therefore decrease with pY. However, we retain the conventional assumption 
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Improvements in transportation technology are essentially reductions in 
the cost of producing the advanced goods. We should therefore not be sur-
prised that their price declines. Those declining goods prices then drive real 
incomes up. As the advanced sector gains a cost advantage, it expands, and 
the traditional sector contracts.
The improvement in communication technology also increases the 
amount of innovation for two reasons, as previously discussed. The returns 
to innovation rise as communication costs fall, and the cost of urban capital 
declines, as we discuss in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 2. As   declines, the price of urban capital falls. The output 
and employment levels in urban manufacturing decline, and wages for produc-
tion workers in the city fall. But innovation and employment in its production 
increase, and the total production of the city increases.
This proposition suggests how we might expect changes in communica-
tion technology to impact various measures of urban success. The price of 
land, which is one widely used metric for the demand for a place, must fall, 
since the urban advantage that accrues to the sector that is on the margin 
between urbanizing and not declines. Urban manufacturing employment 
also declines, because the urban edge in manufacturing falls. As the price of 
urban real estate falls, nominal wages in the city also fall, since those wages 
are set to keep real incomes for production workers equal between the city 
and the hinterland.
On the other hand, population in the city increases, because urban capital 
is ﬁ  xed, and manufacturing is such a heavy user of capital relative to innova-
tion. For this process to work, we must have conversion of old manufactur-
ing space to new residential space for innovators, and we have certainly seen 
much of that in old manufacturing areas such as lower Manhattan. Ware-
houses converted into lofts are a prime example of this process in action. 
The rise of the innovative sector in the city is another more positive sign of 
urban promise.
For the next proposition, we assume that  n   0 so that the distribution 
of innovators’ income is Pareto like the distribution of ability. In this case, 
proposition 3 follows.
PROPOSITION 3. If  n   0, the ratio of the income of the worker who earns 
more than P   percent of the urban workforce to the income of the worker who 
earns more than P    percent of the urban workforce rises as   declines, whenever 
the ﬁ  rst worker is in the innovative sector and the second worker is in manu-
facturing.
This proposition shows that at least some measures of inequality will be 
increasing in the city as technology improves. Decreasing communication 
costs increase the share of the population working in the highly unequal 
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moved from working in highly equal unionized jobs in the textile industry 
to working in ﬁ  nancial services, where the returns to ability (or luck) are 
immense, we witnessed a sizable increase in inequality.
10.3.5      A Purely Innovative City
So far, we have considered an equilibrium with some manufacturing both 
inside and outside of the city. We now consider the case where communica-
tion technology has improved to the point that goods production in the city 
entirely disappears, and the city comes to specialize in innovation. To keep 
things simple, we continue to assume that the information costs associated 
with innovators leaving the city are such that innovation only occurs in the 
city. In this case, the city is entirely innovative, and all innovation is in the 
city. The total amount of innovation in the city is limited by the amount of 
urban capital so that the maximum city population is
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If this condition holds, then there is a threshold       0 such that if the cost 
of distance falls below     , innovation rises to the maximum level possible in 
the city.2 In that case, proposition 4 follows.
PROPOSITION 4. If   declines below     , the amount of innovation, innova-
tive employment, and city population remain constant; output of advanced 
manufacturing increases; the price of advanced goods declines; and all real 
incomes increase.
If and only if    (pY)   0, as   declines below      the price of urban capi-
tal increases, employment in the advanced sector increases, and output and 
employment in the traditional sector contract.
2. Symmetrically, there is also a minimum level of innovation, below which all advanced 
manufacturing, and possibly some traditional production, would occur in the city:
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Although this corner solution is reached for a ﬁ  nite value of  , it does not seem to be relevant 
for a modern economy, and we simply assume that   is always suﬃciently small for manufactur-
ing to be proﬁ  table outside of the city.320        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
Once the city has completely specialized in innovation, further improve-
ment in communication technology will not impact city population any 
more. They may instead start to increase the value of urban property if 
demand for the advanced good is suﬃciently elastic. The elasticity of demand 
for the composite advanced good is important, because it ensures that the 
falling production costs will make innovation more proﬁ  table. In that case, 
further improvements in communication technology increase the amount 
spent on advanced goods, which boosts demand for the ideas produced in 
the city. The model seems to suggest that during an earlier period, when 
manufacturing was still leaving cities like New York and Boston, improving 
communication technologies were associated with declining urban property 
values. However, in the post- 1980 world, when these places have specialized 
highly in idea production, the rise in real estate costs may reﬂ  ect the continu-
ing improvement in the ability of communicating ideas, which has acted to 
increase the returns to innovation.
10.3.6    Two  Cities
Finally, we consider an extension of the model that is intended to cap-
ture the heterogeneous experiences of diﬀerent older cities since 1970, and 
in particular, the diverging fates of innovating and manufacturing cities. 
Divergence occurs in our model, because manufacturing cities are merely 
hit by the declining value of their infrastructure, such as a port or a rail hub; 
while this is true also of innovating cities, they enjoy the counterbalancing 
positive eﬀect of an increase in innovation and therefore in local knowledge 
spillovers.
Suppose that city i  {1, 2} host Li
n innovators, with L1
n   L2
n   0, while 
Ln
R   0 are employed in innovation outside of both cities. Then, knowledge 
spillovers are
(31)  S1   [L1
n    (L2
n   Ln
R)]    S2   [L2
n     (L1
n   Ln
R)]  
    SR   [ (L1
n   L2
n   Ln
R)] ,
implying that it is naturally eﬃcient for all knowledge workers to congregate 
in the same location. While an unstable equilibrium where innovators split 
equally between the two cities is a possibility, we assume that the innova-
tors, either through coordination or decentralized location choices, have 
succeeded in reaping the advantages of locating in a single place, and we 
will refer to the city where innovators cluster as the innovative city. The 
cities are otherwise assumed to be identical: in particular, K1   K2   K   
(1    n)L/  2, the last inequality ensuring again that not all the population 
can be urbanized, given the scarcity of urban capital.
When the innovative city hosts both innovation and manufacturing, while 
the manufacturing city is entirely specialized in manufacturing, proposition 
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PROPOSITION 5. As   declines, relative to the manufacturing city, the inno-
vative city will see the size of its innovative sector grow, the size of its man-
ufacturing sector shrink, its population grow, and its average real income 
increase.
When the value of urban infrastructure  x falls, property values in the manu-
facturing city fall relative to the innovative city.
This proposition emphasizes that declining communication costs increase 
the degree of inequality across cities, as we saw in the previous section. As 
those costs decline, the innovative city sees its population and income grow 
more quickly than the income and population of the manufacturing city.
The second part of the proposition is meant to capture the increasing 
divergence of housing values in New York and Detroit. Older cities were 
built on their physical advantages as transportation hubs, whose impor-
tance has been steadily diminishing; those that did not ﬁ  nd a new source of 
comparative advantage in the agglomeration of innovative individuals are 
bound to decline as their geographic edge is blunted.
10.4      Evidence on Urban Growth
In this section, we turn to the empirical implications of the model about 
disparity between areas. The model predicted that cities that specialized in 
innovation would beneﬁ  t from declining communication costs, while cities 
that specialized in production would be hurt by those costs. The model also 
predicts that urban success will be accompanied by increasing specialization 
in innovative activities.
We start with the awkward task of deﬁ  ning specialization in innovation. 
We mean to deﬁ  ne innovation broadly, and we certainly believe that the 
ﬁ  nanciers of Wall Street and the management consultants of Chicago are 
no less innovative than the software engineers of Silicon Valley. The ﬁ  nance 
sector in New York, for example, is clearly enormously innovative in ways 
that can and do reduce the costs of producing ﬁ  nal goods. As such, to deﬁ  ne 
innovation, we followed the prediction of the model that high human capi-
tal people will specialize in innovation. The prediction pushed us to use 
skilled occupations as a proxy for specialization in innovation. Speciﬁ  cally, 
we deﬁ  ned innovative occupations as those that were among the top 20 per-
cent of occupations on the basis of education, where the share of workers 
with college degrees in 1970 is our measure of education. However, since our 
model is really about the private sector, we excluded those occupations that 
had more than one-  half of their employees working for the government.
Table 10.2 gives a list of the twenty largest occupations ranked by edu-
cation in 1970. While doctors and lawyers rank high on the list, perhaps 
justiﬁ  ably so, the list of skilled occupations includes many diﬀerent types of 
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measuring innovative activity, we think it provides a measure that is at least 
correlated with the level of innovation in the local economy. Moreover, at 
the very least, this measure enables us to test the predictions of the model 
about the correlation between specialization in the high-  skill sector and 
urban success.
In ﬁ  gure 10.5, we show the correlation between this measure of innova-
tive occupations and the metropolitan-  area ﬁ  xed eﬀect in a wage regression 
based on year-  2000 Census Individual Public Use Micro Sample data. The 
wage regression has controlled for individual human capital measures like 
years of schooling and age. The correlation between the wage residual and 
the measure of skilled occupations reminds us that in places with more 
skilled occupations, the wages of everyone appear to be higher, perhaps 
because of human capital spillovers (as in Rauch [1993]).
The model predicts that those cities that specialized in innovation were 
more likely to beneﬁ  t from the improvements in information technology 
that have occurred over the last twenty-  ﬁ  ve years. We test this hypothesis 
by looking at specialization in skilled occupations in 1980 and city growth 
since then. Figure 10.6 shows the 26 percent correlation between income 
growth at the metropolitan-  area level and the initial share of employment 
in the more skilled occupations. A 1 percent increase in skilled occupations 
in 1980 is associated with an approximately 4 percent increase in income 
growth since then.
Table 10.3 considers in a multivariate regression the relationship between 




 4 Physicists  and  astronomers
 5 Veterinarians
 6 Geologists
 7 Chemical  engineers
 8 Optometrists
  9  Petroleum, mining, and geological engineers
10  Other health and therapy occupations
11 Chemists
12 Architects
13  Economists, market researchers, and survey researchers
14 Pharmacists
15  Clergy and religious workers
16  Metallurgical and materials engineers, variously phrased
17 Aerospace  engineers
18 Electrical  engineers
19 Civil  engineers
20 Mechanical  engineers
Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2004).Fig. 10.5    Employment in skilled occupations and knowledge spillovers, 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2004).
Fig. 10.6    Skilled occupations and income growth, 1980 to 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2004).324        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
initial specialization in skilled occupations and growth in both income and 
population, another measure of urban success. In these regressions, we are 
treating metropolitan areas as independent observations, and we are assum-
ing that there is no unobserved heterogeneity that is correlated with our inde-
pendent variables. The ﬁ  rst regression shows the strong positive correlation 
between income and initial concentration in skilled occupations when we 
control for initial population, income, and regional dummies. As the share of 
employment in these skilled occupations increases by 1 percent, we estimate 
that income grows by about 5 percent. This coeﬃcient is almost unchanged 
from the coeﬃcient estimated with no other controls. The second regression 
reproduces this result for the Northeast and the Midwest. The coeﬃcient on 
skilled occupations increases slightly. In the third regression, we also control 
for the initial share of the adult population with college degrees. This control 
reduces our estimated coeﬃcient on skilled occupations by about 40 percent, 
but the coeﬃcient remains statistically and economically signiﬁ  cant.
Regressions (4), (5), and (6) look at the relationship between skilled occu-
pations and population growth. Regression (4) shows that specialization 
in skilled occupations is not correlated with population growth across the 
entire set of metropolitan areas in the United States. Regression (5) shows 
that the correlation is signiﬁ  cantly positive in the set of older metropolitan 
areas in the Northeast and Midwest. Regression (6) shows that in this case, 
Table 10.3  Skilled occupations and growth in income and population, 1980 to 2000
Change in log income Change in log population
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)
Share of workers in high-  skill  5.757 6.684 3.839 1.437 6.071 0.564
  occupations in 1980 (0.943) (1.076) (1.698) (2.129) (1.941) (3.494)
Log income 1980 –0.266 –0.351 –0.278 –0.21 –0.216 –0.254
(0.101) (0.108) (0.101) (0.228) (0.195) (0.189)
Log population 1980 –0.007 –0.003 –0.005 –0.013 –0.046 –0.044
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.029) (0.022) (0.021)
Share of population with bachelor’s  0.676 2.084
  degree in 1980 (0.499) (1.117)
Northeast dummy 0.062 0.054 0.054 –0.029 –0.04 –0.063
(0.026) (0.019) (0.026) (0.058) (0.033) (0.035)
South dummy 0.016 0.006 0.203
(0.026) (0.027) (0.059)
West dummy 0.008 –0.011 0.316
(0.025) (0.028) (0.056)
Constant 2.941 3.729 3.026 2.431 2.73 3.045
(1.031) (1.123) (1.027) (2.327) (2.027) (1.96)
Observations 85 37 85 37 37 37
R2   0.4173   0.6999   0.4309   0.4425   0.2631   0.338
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controlling for initial skills does make the skill occupation coeﬃcient insig-
niﬁ  cant. As such, specialization in innovation does not seem to be important 
in the growing areas of the Sun Belt, but it does seem to be related to the 
success of older places (as in Glaeser and Saiz [2004]). One interpretation of 
the greater importance of innovation in the Rust Belt than in the Sun Belt 
is that the cities in the Sun Belt do not have the same high costs of produc-
tion that limit urban manufacturing in the older areas. Later development 
of these places means that land is more readily available and accessible by 
highways. An alternative interpretation emphasizes the role of skilled people 
in opposing new housing in California.
We now turn to the model’s predicted correlations about increasing inno-
vation. Figure 10.7 shows that places that began within a higher concentra-
tion of workers in skilled industries increased the degree of that concen-
tration between 1980 and 2000. An increase in the initial share of skilled 
occupations of 10 percent is associated with a growth in the share of skilled 
occupations of 5.6 percent. Just as skilled places became more skilled over 
the period (Berry and Glaeser 2005), places that started in more skilled occu-
pations increased their concentration in those occupations. This supports 
the predictions of the model that decreasing communication costs increase 
the diﬀerences in specialization between cities.
Fig. 10.7    Increasing employment in skilled occupations, 1980 to 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2004).326        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
The model also predicts that there will be a positive correlation between 
places that specialized further in idea production and income growth. The 
extremely strong link between changes in income and changes in the share 
of workers in skilled occupations is borne out by the data, as shown in ﬁ  gure 
10.8. The correlation is 46 percent, and from 1980 to 2000, an increase in the 
specialization in skilled sectors by 1 percentage point is associated with a 5 
percent increase in income. Places that specialized further in skilled occupa-
tions became richer.
While patents are only one form of innovation, they do at least represent 
a hard measure of innovative activity. As such, we can look at whether our 
measure of high human capital occupations is correlated with patenting and 
whether we see a correlation between increases in patenting and increases 
in income at the metropolitan-  area level. Our patent data come from the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce. The correlation between our measure of 
skilled occupations and the logarithm of the number of patents at the met-
ropolitan level is 57 percent. The 18 percent correlation between increases in 
patenting and increases in income between 1990 and 2000 is also signiﬁ  cant, 
with a regression coeﬃcient of 0.066 and a standard error of 0.015. None of 
these correlations are overwhelming. Certainly, patented innovations reﬂ  ect 
many local idiosyncrasies and do not fully capture the full range of relevant 
Fig. 10.8    Increasing employment in skilled occupations and income growth, 1980 
to 2000
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breakthroughs. Yet, there is certainly a pattern where skilled occupations 
and patents move together and both correlate with rising income levels.
10.4.1    Inequality  within  Cities
A second implication of the model is that declining communication costs 
will increase the returns to innovative people and that urban inequality will 
rise. The model can also predict that inequality will rise faster in cities that 
are specialized in innovation and more successful.
Figure 10.9 shows the 16 percent correlation between the increase in the 
variance of log incomes within metropolitan areas and the initial specializa-
tion of the metropolitan area in skilled occupations. Places that had more 
skilled occupations became more unequal. The correlation is weaker, but 
still signiﬁ  cant, if we measure inequality by the diﬀerence between the log 
wage at the ninetieth percentile of the income distribution and the log wage 
at the tenth percentile of the income distribution.
Table 10.4 examines whether these regressions hold up in a multivariate 
setting. Regression (1) shows that there is a positive correlation between 
initial specialization in skilled occupations and increases in the variance of 
log income, even controlling for initial income, income variance, population, 
and region dummies. Regression (2) shows that this relationship becomes 
statistically insigniﬁ  cant once we control for the share of the population with 
Fig. 10.9    Skilled occupations and increasing income inequality, 1980 to 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2004).328        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
college degrees. Interestingly, the coeﬃcient on skilled occupations does not 
get smaller, just less precisely estimated. Regressions (3) and (4) reproduce 
(1) and (2) using the diﬀerence in the ninetieth-  percentile log wage and the 
tenth-  percentile log wage. In this case, the coeﬃcient is positive, but the 
results are uniformly insigniﬁ  cant.
Figure 10.10 shows that increasing inequality within cities is also (weakly) 
associated with rising income at the city level. Places that had faster income 
growth were also places that had more growth in the variance of log wages: 
urban success and urban inequality have gone together.
10.5    Conclusion
The past forty years have seen a remarkable range of urban successes and 
failures, especially among America’s older cities. Some places, like Cleve-
land and Detroit, seem caught in perpetual decline. Other areas, like San 
Francisco and New York, had remarkable success as they became centers 
of idea-  based industries.
Table 10.4  Skilled occupations and increasing income inequality, 1980 to 2000
Change in variance 
of log income
Change in 90/10 
income ratio
    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)
Share of workers in high-  skill occupations  1.158 1.224 1.088 1.351
 in  1980 (0.516) (0.941) (0.947) (1.729)
Variance of log income 1980 or 90/10  –0.139 –0.14 –0.455 –0.458
  income ratio 1980 (0.206) (0.207) (0.157) (0.159)
Log income 1980 0.05 0.051 0.077 0.079
(0.055) (0.056) (0.101) (0.103)
Log population 1980 0.03 0.03 0.054 0.053
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.014)
Share of population with bachelor’s  –0.023 –0.093
  degree in 1980 (0.276) (0.509)
Northeast dummy 0.015 0.015 0.01 0.011
(0.014) (0.014) (0.025) (0.026)
South dummy 0.033 0.033 0.069 0.07
(0.016) (0.017) (0.030) (0.032)
West dummy 0.039 0.038 0.098 0.01
(0.015) (0.017) (0.028) (0.032)
Constant –0.859 –0.862 –0.842 –0.852
(0.564) (0.569) (1.04) (1.05)
Observations 85 85 85 85
R2   0.412   0.412   0.346   0.347
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 
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In this chapter, we suggested that these urban successes and urban failures 
might reﬂ  ect the same underlying technological change: a vast improvement 
in communication technology. As communication technology improved, it 
enabled manufacturing ﬁ  rms to leave cities, causing the urban distress of 
Detroit or Manhattan in 1975. However, declining communication costs 
also increased the returns to new innovations, and since cities specialize in 
idea production, this helped invigorate some cities.
The model suggests that future improvements in information technology 
will continue to strengthen cities that are centers of innovation but continue 
to hurt cities that remain oriented toward manufacturing. Certainly, there 
is every reason to think that the free ﬂ  ow of people and capital across space 
will only continue to increase the returns to new ideas. The important ques-
tion for the future of cities is whether urban areas will continue to have a 
comparative advantage in producing ideas.
The great challenge to urban areas therefore comes from the possibility 
that innovation will also leave dense agglomerations. While this is possible, 
there is a remarkable continuing tendency of innovative people to locate 
near other innovative people. Silicon Valley, for example, is built at lower 
densities than New York, because it is built for drivers, not pedestrians, but it 
is certainly a dense agglomeration. As long as improvements in information 
Fig. 10.10    Income growth and increasing income inequality, 1980 to 2000
Source: U.S. Census Bureau and Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles et al. 2004).330        Edward L. Glaeser and Giacomo A. M. Ponzetto
technology continue to increase the returns to having new ideas, the edge 
that proximity gives to innovation seems likely to keep such agglomerations 
strong.
Appendix
Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
Equations (8), (18), and (19) yield equilibrium factor rewards
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The factor market-  clearing conditions in equations (24) and (25) yield
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Finally, considering also equations (4) and (15), the free-  entry condition in 
equation (20) becomes the equilibrium condition
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which deﬁ  nes a unique and stable equilibrium, provided that
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In an interior equilibrium (i.e., for LU   0 and LR   0), as   declines:
1.  Factor rewards in the city decline, since
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2.  Employment in innovation increases, because for    ( pY)   0, the equi-
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Ln <0
by the stability condition in equation (28). As the technology of production 
does not change, this implies that the amount of innovation increases.
3. The prices of advanced goods and the relative price index decline, 
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It follows that the real income of all agents increases.
4.  Employment in urban manufacturing contracts, since
 L U   
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Ln ⇒ 
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   0.
As the technology of production does not change, this implies that the out-
put of urban manufacturing declines.
5.  Urban population increases, since
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6.  Total output of advanced goods expands, because
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A fortiori, output of advanced manufacturing outside of the city expands, 
and output of the Dixit-  Stiglitz aggregate expands, because
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 n 
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7.  Output of the traditional good contracts, because
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Proof of Proposition 3
The income of an urban innovator with productivity a is
y(a)   a SU   wK n.Did the Death of Distance Hurt Detroit and Help New York?    3 3 3
Thus, for  n   0, the income distribution of innovators follows a Pareto distri-
bution, with shape   and minimum 1   wK dictated by the indiﬀerence condi-
tion of the marginal innovator. Recalling equation (9), the value of percentile 
p in a Pareto distribution with minimum 1   wK is (1   wK) (1 –   p)– 1/  .
If fraction   of the city population is employed in manufacturing and 
1 –    in innovation, the value of percentile P       of the urban income distri-
bution is the homogeneous income of manufacturing workers 1   wK, while 
percentile P       corresponds to percentile p   (P   –   ) /  (1 –   ) of the income 
distribution of innovators. Thus, their ratio is
 R     
1    
 
1   P   

















   0.
Proof of Proposition 4
When the city is completely specialized and all innovation occurs in the 
city, equation (29) denotes total employment in innovation, while LU   0. 
Then, prices are
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and quantities are
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and by the labor market-  clearing condition in equation (24),
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Finally, the free-  entry condition in equation (20) yields the equilibrium 
price of urban capital
wK   
(    1)(1    ) (pY)
   









   
    (1    ) (pY)
   
(    1)(1    ) (pY) ,
which is positive by the condition in equation (30).
Innovation does not expand out of the city, as long as
(1    n)      1   (1    n)wK   
(    1)(1    ) (pY)
   





   1 .
Then, as   declines below    , it is straightforward that:
1. The amount of innovation is ﬁ  xed at n   by the urban capacity con-
straint; employment in the innovative sector and city population are likewise 
constrained.
2.  The relative price of diﬀerentiated goods px declines. The price index 
for the advanced sector pY declines, and therefore the real income of all 
agents increases.
3. Output of the diﬀerentiated goods X and of their aggregate Y in-
creases.
If and only if   (pY)   0, as   declines below    :
1.  The relative price of urban capital increases, since
 wK  
  
   0 and 
 wK  
 pY
   
[1   (1    n)wK]
   














    
 (L   L  n)
   
[1   (1    ) (pY)]2    (pY).
Thus, employment in the traditional sector contracts, and conversely, 
employment in the advanced sector expands.
Proof of Proposition 5
Equilibrium factor rewards are
 w 1
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prices are
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and letting L1 and L2 denote employment in manufacturing in the two cities, 
quantities are
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Factor market-  clearing implies
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so the free-  entry condition becomes the equilibrium condition
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The comparative statics are analogous to those in propositions 1 and 2, 
even if  x and  –     now appear independently and not only combined in the 
single parameter  . The equilibrium system
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and therefore, for all   (pY)   0,
and
recalling the scarcity assumption (1    n) L   2K and the stability condition 
in equation (28).
As   falls, because of a decline in any combination of  x and  –    , Ln 
increases: this implies that in the ﬁ  rst city, the innovative sector grows, the 
manufacturing sector contracts, and population grows—none of which 
happens in the second city. Relative real income grows with Ln, because all 
inframarginal innovators are earning a positive proﬁ  t from their creativity.
Moreover, the relative value of urban capital in the innovative city increases 
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